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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Allen Pasborg timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. Mr. Pasborg argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process 
and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts he 
requested be added to the record on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Pasborg argues that the 
district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon 
revoking his probation. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Pasborg was sixteen years old when he and a friend kicked in the backdoor 
of a restaurant and demanded money from the employees. (Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.72-73.) Mr. Pasborg's friend had a large knife, which was 
used to cut a phone cord. (08/31/06 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-7.) Mr. Pasborg was also armed with 
a knife, but it was not visible. (08/31/06 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-4.) Mr. Pasborg and his friend 
stole approximately $100.00 and they were quickly arrested after leaving the restaurant. 
(PSI, p.73.) 
Mr. Pasborg was charged with robbery and burglary, and was automatically 
waived into adult court. (PSI, pp.11-12, 36-37.)1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Pasborg pleaded guilty to robbery and the remaining charge was dismissed. 
(R., pp.38-40, 42.) The district court determined that this case was not appropriate for 
adult sentencing. (R., pp.42-41.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction, committing 
1 
Mr. Pasborg to the Department of Juvenile Correction until Mr. Pasborg reached twenty 
one years of age or until the court entered an order authorizing a different disposition. 
(R., pp.42-44.) 
After a period of retained jurisdiction, the State moved the district court for a 
status hearing because it had determined that Mr. Pasborg reached the Department's 
rehabilitative goals and he was ready from release from custody. (R., pp.45-50.) The 
district court then suspended Mr. Pasborg's sentence and placed him on probation. 
(R., pp.74-75.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion to have Mr. Pasborg arrested 
for alleged probation violations. (R., pp.98-100.) Mr. Pasborg admitted to violating the 
terms of his probation for failing to report to his probation officer, committing the 
misdemeanor crime of assault, committing the crime of resisting or obstructing law 
enforcement, committing the crime of possession or consumption of alcohol by a minor, 
and violating a no contact order. (R., pp.98-100, 104.) Thereafter, the district court 
revoked, then reinstated, Mr. Pasborg's probation. (R., pp.105-107.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation 
alleging that Mr. Pasborg violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.125-127.) 
Mr. Pasborg admitted to violating the terms of his probation for failing to report to his 
probation officer and using marijuana on multiple occasions. (R., pp.125-127, 135.) 
On September 2, 2010, the district court revoked Mr. Pasborg's probation and retained 
jurisdiction for 180 days.2 (R., pp.140-141.) Approximately 186 days later, the district 
1 Citations to the PSI will adhere to the pagination contained in the electronic PDF 
format. 
2 At the date of this sentencing hearing, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) had been amended by the 
Idaho Legislature enabling the district court to retain jurisdiction "for a period ... up to" 
365 days. (R., p.140.) 
2 
court reviewed Mr. Pasborg's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), and 
placed him on probation. (R., pp.144-147.) 
After a third period of probation, the State filed a motion for bench warrant for 
probation violation, wherein it alleged that Mr. Pasborg violated the terms of his 
probation (R., pp.157-160.) Mr. Pasborg admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation for using marijuana on multiple occasions, failing to submit to a urinalysis test, 
driving without privileges, and absconding. (R., pp.157-160, 174.) The district court 
revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. 
Mr. Pasborg timely appealed. (R., pp.190-192.) 
(R., pp.187-188.) 
On appeal, Mr. Pasborg filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected, in part, to Mr. Pasborg's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting 
his request for one transcript, but denied his request for transcripts of the guilty plea 
hearing held July 17, 2006, the sentencing hearing held March 24, 2008, the review 
hearing held June 23, 2008, the admit/deny Hearing held June 1, 2009, the disposition 
hearing held July 13, 2009, the admit/deny hearing held July 12, 2010, the disposition 
hearing held September 1, 2010, and the rider review hearing held March 7, 2011. 
(Order (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Pasborg due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for 
review of the issues on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence 
sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Pasborg Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Transcripts 
Necessary For Review Of Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Pasborg's request for 
transcripts of the guilty plea hearing held July 17, 2006, the sentencing hearing held 
March 24, 2008, the review hearing held June 23, 2008, the admit/deny Hearing held 
June 1, 2009, the disposition hearing held July 12, 2009, the admit/deny hearing held 
July 12, 2010, the disposition hearing held September 1, 2010, and the rider review 
hearing held March 7, 2011. On appeal, Mr. Pasborg is challenging the Idaho Supreme 
Court's denial of his request for these transcripts. Mr. Pasborg asserts that the 
requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation 
because the applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an 
independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district 
5 
court's sentencing decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his 
request. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Pasborg With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. 
art.I§13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). Const. 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. 
See I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a 
relevant transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
6 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 
11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion 
for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 
11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the 
requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
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certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, 
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
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provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin wt1en it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable 
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that 
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its statement in 
Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the stenographic 
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id. 
at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the 
defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The Court ultimately 
9 
concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be adequately reviewed 
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that 
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If a review of the 
appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts it becomes the State's 
burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App. 
2007). 
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created 
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are 
not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
C. The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Pasborg's Appeal Because He 
Is Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of 
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire 
Record Before The District Court 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we 
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. 
10 
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." 
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other 
words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an 
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district 
court's decisions. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not 
required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 
666 (1984). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of a revocation of 
probation order. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. After he completed his rider, the district court placed the 
defendant on probation. Id. at 620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant 
appealed from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-621. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the 
11 
appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation 
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation 
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court 
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. Specifically 
it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a// 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis). 
The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan was challenging the order 
revoking probation and Mr. Pasborg is challenging the length of his sentence, which 
entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation 
of probation."3 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the 
3 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to 
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on 
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was 
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals 
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules 
require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
12 
requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation 
revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the 
issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is not 
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal 
is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official 
position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings 
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the 
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A. R. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcriptor clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Mr. Pasborg is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to 
file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110 expressly 
prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could 
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Pasborg recongnizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 
Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Cornelison is not yet final, 
and Mr. Pasborg's disagrees with the holding in that case. 
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"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the 
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. 
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not 
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it already knows from 
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking 
probation. 
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the 
Court of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record 
when reviewing the executed sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
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As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation 
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events 
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this 
standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It 
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the 
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly 
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this 
standard of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
presumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when 
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the 
prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume 
that the district court will remember the events from the prior proceedings when it 
executes a sentence after revoking probation. 
In this case, Judge Bail presided over the final disposition hearing held on July 2, 
2012. (R., pp.186.) Judge Bail also presided over all of the hearings at issue. 
(R., pp.38, 72, 83, 104-105, 135, 139, 144.) As such, the Adams opinion indicates that 
an appellate court will presume Judge Bail relied on her memory of those proceedings 
when it executed Mr. Pasborg's sentence without reduction after revoking probation. 
Therefore, transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to 
review the merits of his appellate sentencing claims. 
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Pasborg access to those transcripts 
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constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477 (1863), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be 
dismissed without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an 
appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing 
State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985)). If transcripts are missing, but the record contains 
court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim 
is possible, then transcripts are not necessary for appellate review, even though the 
Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the 
district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. 
Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Pasborg fails to provide the 
appellate court with transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption 
will apply and Mr. Pasborg's sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual 
merits. If it is state action alone which prevents him from access to the necessary 
items, then such action is a violation of equal protection and due process and any such 
presumption should no longer apply. 
Moreover, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case and what 
occurred at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's final 
sentencing decision. When Mr. Pasborg was first placed on probation and given the 
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opportunity for multiple periods of probation, the district court must have found that the 
circumstances were right to give him the opportunity to be a member of society. To 
ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a 
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Pasborg. Denial of access to the requested transcripts 
has prevented Mr. Pasborg from addressing those positive factors in support of his 
appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Pasborg argues that the events 
which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate the district 
court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for 
a merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal because the applicable standard of review of an appellate sentencing claim 
requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all of the proceedings 
before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not on the district 
court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on appeal is if the 
record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As such, the 
decision to deny Mr. Pasborg's request for the transcripts will render his appeal 
meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts support the district 
court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to the review of 
Mr. Pasborg's appellate sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, he should either 
be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
Since Mr. Pasborg's request for those transcripts was denied, that presumption should 
be reversed in favor of Mr. Pasborg. 
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D. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Pasborg With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due 
process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the United 
States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Pasborg has not obtained 
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review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective 
assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Pasborg on 
the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Pasborg is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Pasborg his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection which include a right to 
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be 
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity 
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to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Pasborg's 
Sentence, Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Pasborg asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under 
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation 
of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being 
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Pasborg does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Pasborg must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
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The risk Mr. Pasborg posed to society gradually reduced as this case proceeded. 
While his sentence was appropriate at the time he was originally sentenced, it was 
excessively harsh when the district court revoked probation. Mr. Pasborg's underlying 
offense was an armed robbery. (R., pp.36-37.) Mr. Pasborg's most recent probation 
violations were mainly related to driving and his substance addiction. (R., pp.157-160, 
17 4.) According to trial counsel, "Certainly there is no doubt that he's picked up some 
new crimes along the way in this probation violation. However, they appear to be more 
driving-related, not crimes of violence, not crimes similar in nature to the crimes he was 
on probation for." (05/07/12 Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.10, L.1.) Prior to the final probation 
violation disposition hearing, Mr. Pasborg was attending AA and had family support in 
the community. (05/07 /12 Tr., p.10, Ls.16-24.) Mr. Pasborg was employed at the time 
he was arrested for his probation violations and his employer indicated that he was 
eligible for rehire. (05/07/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-8.) 
Some of Mr. Pasborg's behavior can be explained by the fact his father died in 
2003 and since that time he was raised by a parent and step-parent, and exposed to 
domestic violence and drug use. (PSI, pp.94, 97-98; 08/31/06 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-22.) 
Despite these setbacks, Mr. Pasborg earned his high school diploma and was 
interested in applying to Boise State University. (PSI, p.5.) While on his rider, 
Mr. Pasborg developed skills which will aid him in graduating from college. (Addendum 
to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), pp.5-6.) 
Mr. Pasborg's positive performance on his rider indicates that he is amenable to 
rehabilitation. Mr. Pasborg did not receive any formal or informal disciplinary sanctions 
while in his rider. (APSI, p.4.) While in treatment programs, Mr. Pasborg was "honest" 
and "upfront" about his past and displayed the necessary effort required to "change and 
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commit to recovery." (APSI, p.7.) Mr. Pasborg was an above average participant in his 
treatment programs and earned a probation recommendation from the Department of 
Correction. (APSI, pp.4-6.) After Mr. Pasborg completed all his programming, he 
remained in the custody pending his rider review hearing. (APSI, p.14.) During that 
time he utilized "the skills he learned by being a positive role model in his unit." (Letter 
written by Darcie Weber attached to APSI, p.1.) According to his case manager: 
Mr. Pasborg has been using his time constructively; volunteering for small 
projects such as cleaning programming binders and helping [sanitize] his 
housing unit. He has also given his time to new programmers who have 
questions or need help with assignments. Mr. Pasborg expresses that he 
enjoys helping others with their preparations for community group and is 
consistently practicing his active listening skills. 
Mr. Pasborg was given a job working in the kitchen and has done 
well making the transition from programmer to worker. It has been 
confirmed with unit staff that he reports to work on time and with a positive 
attitude. 
(Letter written by Darcie Weber attached to APSI, p.1.) 
In sum, Mr. Pasborg has been dealing with this case since he was sixteen years 
old. He recognizes that he was not a perfect probationer, but he did utilize the 
rehabilitative programming he has received thus far. Mr. Pasborg's rehabilitative 
progress is evident by the fact his recent behavior posed a significantly lower threat to 
society when that behavior is compared to his actions involved in the underlying 
offense. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pasborg respectfully requests access to the transcripts at issue and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Pasborg respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence. Alternatively, 
Mr. Pasborg respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 2013. 
. / /'4,,9· • . 
. s7 '.l~:.·sHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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